Kang Haggerty NewsPA Law Weekly
Articles Posted in Publications
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds That CASPA Does Not Apply Where The Owner Is A Government Entity
In Clipper Pipe & Serv., Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, 73 P.S. §§ 501-506 (“CASPA”), does not apply to construction projects where the owner is a government entity.
The United States Department of the Navy had entered into an agreement with Contracting Systems, Inc. II (“CSI”) for the construction of an addition to, and renovations of, a training center in Lehigh Valley. CSI, in turn, subcontracted with Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc. (“Clipper”) to perform heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work. When CSI failed to pay Clipper per the terms of their agreement, Clipper filed suit against CSI and its surety, the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“OCIC”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
OCIC and CSI moved for summary judgment contending that CASPA does not apply to public works projects because a government entity does not qualify as an “owner” under CASPA. CASPA defines an “owner” as “[a] person who has an interest in real property that is improved and who ordered the improvement to be made.” “Person” is defined as “[a] corporation, partnership, business trust, other association, estate, trust foundation or a natural individual.” According to CSI and OCIC, government bodies cannot be “owners” under CASPA because the word “government” does not appear in the definition – i.e., a government body is not an “association” and therefore not a “person” or “owner.” Further, OCIC and CSI argued that the Prompt Payment Act (“PPA”), not CASPA, addresses public works projects. OCIC and CSI argued that given the substantial differences between CASPA and PPA, it would be untenable if both applied simultaneously.
How to Protect the Reputation of Your Small Business
Philadelphia Business Journal
PA Supreme Court Ruling: Attorney Fees are Not an “Ascertainable Loss” Under the PA UTPCPL
The extent of consumer protection of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in Christina Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC, 4 MAP 2014. The Court finally decided legal fees alone do not satisfy “any ascertainable loss” as described by the UTPCPL.
Why Your Company Needs a Business Valuation – Today
Philadelphia Business Journal
Three Big Reasons Family Businesses Fail…and How to Avoid Them
Philadelphia Business Journal
Shareholders, not the Corporation, Holds Attorney-Client Privilege for Communications Between the Shareholders and Counsel
On August 7, 2014, the Western District of Pennsylvania’s Judge Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. entered an order preliminary denying plaintiff’s motion to compel compliance with subpoena on counsel. In the case of Gary Miller Imports, Inc. v. Carter Dolittle, et al., plaintiff sought to compel the law firm of Macdonad Illig Jones & Britton, LLP to produce eight documents they felt did not fall under attorney-client privilege. Continue reading ›
Pennsylvania Adopts Amendment Creating Bright-Line Rule on Attorney-Expert Communications during Discovery
Continuing off our earlier blog post that had raised questions regarding attorney-expert communications in Barrick, et al. v. Holy Spirit Hospital, et al. (read here!), on July 10, 2014 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made official a rule change barring attorney-expert communications during discovery. Following its decision in Barrick, the Supreme Court approved an amendment to the Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.5 concerning attorney-expert communication during discovery. This amendment to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure created a bright-line rule, and creates a difficult arena for attorneys to maneuver during the discovery process.
Third Circuit Adopts Liberal Notice Pleading Standard for False Claims Act Cases
Refusing to adopt the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b), the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for New Jersey’s order, which held that Plaintiff Foglia failed to meet the pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) for pleading a false claims act case. U.S. ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 2014 WL 2535339 (3d Cir. June 6, 2014). In contrast to the District Court, the Third Circuit agreed to a more liberal standard for pleading cases under the federal False Claims Act and concluded that Foglia’s factually false claim against Renal proved sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b). The circuits are split over whether a whistleblower must allege specific examples of false claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the Third Circuit held that the whistleblower need not provide such specific examples.