Articles Posted in Publications

The common interest doctrine (CID), also known as the community-of-interest doctrine, is an exception to the general rule that attorney-client privilege (ACP) is waived when privileged information is shared with a third party. The CID allows attorneys representing different clients with the same or substantially similar legal interests to agree to (and do) share privileged information without waiving the ACP.

For the CID to apply, (1) there must generally be co-parties (that is, co-plaintiffs or co-defendants—but the CID may also apply to communications between parties and nonparties, and sometimes in nonlitigation matters), (2) the co-parties must be represented by separate counsel (the CID is different from the co-client (or joint-client) privilege, which applies when multiple clients hire the same attorney to represent them on a matter of common interest), and (3) the co-parties must share a common legal interest, not merely a common commercial interest. Courts are divided on whether interests must be legally identical or somewhat less than that, such as substantially similar. And, of course, there must be an agreement among attorneys to share information.

If the above requirements are met, separate counsel for separate parties (or clients) may share information without waiving the ACP. In other words, the CID only protects communications between counsel, not between parties. Communications between parties are protected under the CID, however, if counsel is present during the communications. Continue reading ›

In Edward Kang’s March 2016 civil litigation column in The Legal Intelligencer and the Pennsylvania Law Weekly, he writes on the issue of M&As and Attorney-Client Privilege of Selling Corporations.

Courts have long recognized that the attorney-client privilege extends to corporations, as in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Because a corporation can act only through its agents, usually officers, a corporation’s attorney-client privilege generally applies to communications between the corporation’s authorized agents and counsel. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Upjohn, however, it is the corporation that holds the corporate attorney-client privilege, not individual officers.

Continue reading ›

“Thinking about making a lateral move to a small, boutique law firm? Recruiting successful laterals is critical to any firm’s success, regardless of size, and firms consider many factors in making a lateral hire. But for a small, boutique firm, a lateral hire will have an immediate impact. While big law firms can hire in large numbers and count on the laws of attrition to weed out the good from the bad hires, it is critical that small, boutique firms make the right calls—for the sake of both the law firm and the lateral,” writes Edward Kang in an article on lateral hiring as part of The Legal Intelligencer’s Top Laterals/New Partners supplement.

In the feature, Edward addresses some of the considerations to keep in mind when comparing a small, boutique law firm to a big firm; the importance of understanding the business of law; and the need for an appropriate business plan. Learn more about what Kang Haggerty looks for in a lateral and what a lateral should consider from a jump to a new law firm…READ MORE

PA Law Weekly:  Kang on CFAA and its impact on employer-employee litigation

January 30, 2016

Throughout 2016, Edward Kang will be a regular contributor to the Pennsylvania Law Weekly and The Legal Intelligencer on civil litigation issues impacting attorneys throughout the state. This month he writes on the topic of the CFAA and its impact on employer-employee litigation.

Continue reading ›

In Clipper Pipe & Serv., Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act, 73 P.S. §§ 501-506 (“CASPA”), does not apply to construction projects where the owner is a government entity.

The United States Department of the Navy had entered into an agreement with Contracting Systems, Inc. II (“CSI”) for the construction of an addition to, and renovations of, a training center in Lehigh Valley. CSI, in turn, subcontracted with Clipper Pipe & Service, Inc. (“Clipper”) to perform heating, ventilation, and air conditioning work. When CSI failed to pay Clipper per the terms of their agreement, Clipper filed suit against CSI and its surety, the Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“OCIC”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

OCIC and CSI moved for summary judgment contending that CASPA does not apply to public works projects because a government entity does not qualify as an “owner” under CASPA. CASPA defines an “owner” as “[a] person who has an interest in real property that is improved and who ordered the improvement to be made.” “Person” is defined as “[a] corporation, partnership, business trust, other association, estate, trust foundation or a natural individual.” According to CSI and OCIC, government bodies cannot be “owners” under CASPA because the word “government” does not appear in the definition – i.e., a government body is not an “association” and therefore not a “person” or “owner.” Further, OCIC and CSI argued that the Prompt Payment Act (“PPA”), not CASPA, addresses public works projects. OCIC and CSI argued that given the substantial differences between CASPA and PPA, it would be untenable if both applied simultaneously.

The extent of consumer protection of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in Christina Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Company of Philadelphia, LLC, 4 MAP 2014. The Court finally decided legal fees alone do not satisfy “any ascertainable loss” as described by the UTPCPL.

Continue reading ›

Contact Information